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ABSTRACT 
InvestigatIng the capabilities of public key and related cryptographic techniques 
has recently become an important area of cryptographic research. In this paper we 
present some new algorithms and cryptographic protocols (Cryptoprotocols) which 
enlarge the range of applications of public key systems and enable us to perform 
certain transactions In communication networks. The basic cryptographic tools used 
are Rabm's Oblivious Transfer Protocol and an algor.ithm we developed for Number 
Embedding which is provably hard to invert. 
\Ve introduce the protocol Subscription to a Public Key, which gives a way to 
transfer keys over insecure communication channels and has useful applications to 
cryptosystf>ms. \Ve develop the Secret Blocking Protocol, specified as follows 'A 
transfers a secret to B, B can block the message. If B does not block it, there is a 
probabllity P that he might get it. (1/2 <P < 1, where we can control the size 
of P). A does not know if the message was blocked (but he can find out later)'. 
The classlc cryptotransactlOn is the A1ental Poker Game. A cryptographically 
secure solutIOn to thE' A.fulli Player Mental Poker Game is given. The approach 
used in constructing the solution provides a general methodology of provable and 
modular Protocol Composition. 
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1. INTRODCCTION 
Complexily-based cryptography has two major areas of application: Public Key 
Cryplosystems [7] [15], to provide secure and authenticated communication, and 
Cryptographic Transactions, Cryptotransactions for short, to enable simulation of 
certain activities in communication [4] [6] [17]. These activities, while easily done 
f ace to face seem im possi ble to perform through the use of a comm unication 
net\\'ork. 
In this paper we present some new Cryptoprotocols to be used both for increasing 
security and flexibility of Public-Key Cryptosystems and as tools for implementing 
Cryptotransactions. The security of these protocols is based on the intractability of 
the factorization problem. The basic cryptographic tools used are Rabin's Oblivious 
Transfer Protocol and an algorithm for number embedding which is provably hard 
to invert. The results reported here were motivated by Blum's paper [4] and are 
based on [19] 
\Ve introduce the protocol Subscription to a Public Key, used for transferring 
keys over insecure communication channels and which has useful applications for 
cryptosystems. \Ve then develop the Secret Blocking Protocol, specified as follows : 
)) A transfers a secret to B. B can block the message. If B does not block the 
message he gets it with probability = P, where 1/2 <P < 1, and we can control 
the size of P. A does not know if the message was blocked, but he can find out 
later". 
The classic cryptotransaction is the Mental Poker Game. The problem, proposed 
by Robert Floyd, is: 'Is it possible to play a fair poker game over the telephone 7' 
Shamir, Rivest and Adleman [17] proved that from an information theoretic point of 
view it IS impossible to play the game. They showed, however that froJIl a 
complexity theoretic point of view, the game can be played, using the one way 
commutallve modular exponentiation function. Although their protocol is elegant 
and the number of players is unlimited, Lipton [10] showed that one can easily 
mark some subsets of cards using it. We present a cryptographically secure 
solution to the Afulti Player Afental Poker Game. Different solutions to the Two 
Player t>.lental Poker Game have recently been obtained independently by Blum [5], 
and by Goldwasser and r-.1icali [8]. Their solutions include a protocol for Two Player 
Card Dealing. 
The approach used in constructing the solution gIves a general methodology of 
provable and modular Protocol Composition 
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2. N urn ber Theoretic and Cryptographic Background 
2.1. NUMBER THEORETIC ALGORITHMS AND PUBLIC lillY SYSTE~fS 
The main assumption is: FACTORIZATION of a number n=p q, where p and q 
are large (say IOO-digit) prime numbers is I-Li\RD to solve. On the other hand, 
some number theoretic algorithms that we use are EASY (random polynomial time). 
These include the primality test, [18] [9], prime generation and root extraction of 
xZ(modn) given the factors of n [12]. (For a survey of number theory and number 
theoretic algorithms see [11] [9] [I].) In the protocols presented in this paper, we 
need an underlying public key system in order to transmit encoded and signed 
messages and to hide information using one way functions. Either the RSA system 
[1.5], the Rabin system [12], or the Blum-Goldwasser system [3] can be used. (If 
we use RSA we add the assumption that RSA breaking is HARD) 
2.2. RABIN'S OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER PROTOCOL 
Rabin found a way to send a secret obliviously, that is, the sender A does not 
know if the secret is successfully transmitted to B, the probability of success is 1/2. 
Protocol 1 -THE OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER: 
step 1 : A creates a number n =p q. (The prime factorization of n is the secret.) 
step 2 : A-->B : " n". (--> means 'sends to'.) 
step 3 : B selects a random x and computes z = xZ(mod n). 8-- >A : " z". 
step 4 : A, knowing the factorization of n, computes the 4 square roots of z = 
{ x,-x,y,-y} He selects at random one of them, calls it sand A-- >8:" s" 
step 5 : If B receives y or -y he gets the secret, if he receives x or -x he does not. 
end {protocol I} 
Theorem I: Given x,yEZn • (that is x,y<n and do not divide n), x FY 
(mod n), -x FY (mod n) and X2=y2 (mod n), there is an EASY algorithm 
for factoring n. 
Based on the prevIous theorem we can prove the properties of the above protocol: 
Theorem 2: Using the oblivious transfer protocol, B can factor n (get 
the secret) With a probability (virtually) equal to 1/2 A can not know if 
he transferred the secret successfully. 
2.3. O~ WAY r-..'U~fBER E~1BEDDING 
Number em bedding is an algorithm which gets a number tvl as input and 
distnbutes It Into some pieces of information EM(M) which hide M. Giving E.M(t-.l) 
does not compromise tvl because in order to recover the number from the available 
hicitng Information one has to solve a HARD problem. E~vl(~t) can be recovered to 
one and only one num ber' ~t In [4] Blum gave such an algorithm. Here we use 
polynomial interpolation to design a number em bedding algorithm that is provably 
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fL-lRD to recover. 
Algorithm 2 - EMBEDDING USI~G INTERPOLATION 
step 1: Choose K (say K=10) random 100-digit prime numbers Pj' i=l, .. ,10. 
step 2: Choose 10 random 99-digit prime numbers qj, i=l, .. ,10. 
step 3: Construct a polynomial of degree 10: P (mod R), where R is a large prime 
(R>pj,qj i=l, .. ,10), by using the 11 interpolation points: (Pj,qJ i=l, .. ,10, and 
(0,:\1) . 
step 4: Compute nj=pj qj (n j hides interpolation point i). The embedding of M is 
the sequence consisting of: R (the modulus), the numbers nj, i=l, .. ,10, and a point 
(u,v) such that v=P(u), where u is a random number different from 0 and the Pj's. 
end {algorithm 2} 
The Result of the Algorithm: 
Given Eivl(i\l), one has to factor the 10 nj's to recover the unknown 
:M. Factorization of any 9 of them does not help (see [16]). Given Ml F~, we 
can embed both using the same nj's; only the additional random point (u,v) is 
different. Therefore we can prepare all the nj's before the communication. EM is 
a one way one to many random operator. Using the fact that generation of 
numbers of the form n=p q is easy, and the random polynomial algorithm [2] [13] 
for finding rools of polynomials over GF(R) we can show that recovering of M is 
polynomially equivalent to factorization. The reduction to factorization is given In 
the following theorem: 
Theorem 3: If we can easily recover M from EM(M) (even in f of the 
times) we can easily factor numbers of the form n=p q. 
Now consider the oblivious transfer protocoL If we want A to be able to check 
whether or not he gave B the secret then we use Oblivious Transfer With Receipt: 
\Vhen B sends z = x2 (mod n) he also sends EM(x) which is the receipt which 
hides x unambiguously. The receipt also makes it possible to check that z was 
created by squanng an xEZn • and is not a 'special quadratic', a quadratic such that 
knowledge of any of its roots enables factorization. It was suggested in [14] 
overcoming thiS problem by sending K quadratics in step 3 from which B chooses 
K-1 at random and asks A to send their roots first and then the protocol goes on 
with the remaining quadratic 
3. SUBSCRIPTION TO A PUBLIC-KEY 
The problem is A has a public-key E =(n,e), based on n=p q (RSA [15], Rabin 
[12] or Blum-Goldwasser [3]). A wants B to subscribe to the key, namely to get 
the decryption key D=(n,d). To solve this problem without compromising the key, 
A and B use the follOWing cryptotransaction: 
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Protocol 3 - SUBSCRIPTION TO A KEY 
step 1 : A publicizes E. 
steP 2 : 
a.. 8 chooses K random numbers (say K=10): Xl' .... ' xlO · 
b. B checks: if gcd(xi,n) is not trivial for some xi' then STOP. (B got the key, the 
chance for this IS virtually zero.) 
Otherwise 8 computes Zi = xi:! (mod n), i=1, .. 10. B-->A: "zi, i=1, .. ,10". 
step 3 : 
a. A, knowing the factorization of n, computes the 4 square roots of zi = 
{ xi' -Xj, .Yi' -Yj }, 1=1, .. ,10. 
b. A uses procedure SELECT to choose one of the roots, and calls it Sj (the 
SELECT process makes sure that if Zj is sent twice then the same Sj is chosen). 
c. A-->B : "Si' i=I,,,,10". 
end {protocol 3} 
Theorem 4: The protocol "Subscription to a Public-Key" .ensures: 
1. B gets the decryption key with probability at least 1-(1/ 210). 
2. An eavesdropper cannot get information from the protocol which helps 
him factor n. 
The above protocol has several applications to cryptosystems (e.g. distribution of a 
group key). 
4. ABSTRACTION OF THE "MENTAL POKER GAME" 
4.1. SPECIFICATION OF THE GA~1E 
For A and B to play a fair "Mental Poker Game" we need the following 
protocols 
1 A protocol for Dealing Cards. The security and verifiability specifications 
contalll some antagonistic requirements which make the problem interesting. 
2 Protocols for other game steps: These include discarding cards from one's hand, 
opening a card, etc In a secure and checkable way . 
. 3 A Protocol for the Game Afanagement which links all the game steps together 
lllto a complete game. 
4.2. DEFINITION OF CARD SETS 
\Ve define sets which are changed dynamically during the game. 
ALL - the set of all the cards which is the universal (ordered) set: {1,2,3,.",52}. 
AH.4.J.\'D (BHAND ) - cards which are currently in the hand of A (8). 
AFSED (BUSED) - cards whiSh were thrown from the hand of A (8). 
AS.-HV = AHAIVD U Ai/SED , BSAW = BHAND U BUSED , 
SAlV = ASAIV U BSAW 
AOPEiV ( BOPEN ) { TOPES} - cards opened by A (by 8) {to the table}. 
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OPEN = AOPEN U BOPEN U TOPEN . 
DECK = ALL - {SAHt U OPEN} - the cards currently in the deck. 
DECK,4 = DECK U BSA~V - cards that according to. A's partial knowledge can 
still be in the deck. 
DECK8 = DECK U A.SA~V - possible deck according to B's partial knowledge. 
4.3. REPRESENTATION OF THE GAME 
The game is fully represented by the card sets, so we can look at the game as a 
Knowledge Set Transition System: The Interpretation of the game as a formal 
system helps us to design it and to prove its properties, using formal inference 
about user knowledge and card sets. 
States : States are positional vectors of sets which are subsets of AL~. 
A. game-state : GS = (DECK, AHAND, BHAND, A.SA~V, BSAW; OPEN). 
A special state is the illegal state which is a dead state. 
The initial state is (ALL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) 
Know/edge : The player's partial knowledge of the game, at any moment of the 
game is also represented by a set vector. The set notation is augmented by the 
following: 1. ? - an unknown set. 2. ?j - an unknown set of size i, where the 
SIze is the only knowledge about it. A's Partial-Knowledge (PK) of the game is: 
- PK(A) = (?IDECKI ' AHAND, ?18HANDI ,ASAW, ?18SAU'1 ' OPEN) 
Transitions : The transitions are the game steps {Dealing, Discarding, Opening, 
Opening from DECK}. Any illegal game step leads to the illegal state. 
Our proof technique uses assertions on knowledge and card sets, showing for 
example that the following are game-invariant: A.SA~V n BSAlV =0, DECK n 
SAH' =0, 
ASAlV n BSA1V =0, DECKA n DECKB =DECK and the fact that combining 
both pl.ayers PK's gives the game state . 
. 5. An Algorithm for Dealing Cards 
S.l. FIRST APPROXIl-.IATION OF THE DEALING PROTOCOL 
The general idea. \Vhen B draws cards from DECK, they are actually offered to 
hIm by A as follows: 
A knows DECK,4 = (DECK U BSAW) = ALL - {ASA1V U OPEN}. 
Using this knowledge, A tries to transfer cards he has not yet seen without 
revealing whIch cards he is offering and without being able to know which cards 
are chosen by B During the process of dealing B gets a card M E DECK, thIS 
card is a random card from the deck. \Vhen B gets the j cards he needs 
t-.\, .. ,t-.lj he IS responsible for halting the dealing without trying to look at other 
cards In DECI{ Then B updates: BHAND:= BHAND U {Ml' ....... ,~I); 
BSAW= BSAIV U BHAND 
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Protocol 4: THE DEALING OF CARDS PROTOCOL 
- step 1 : 
a. A chooses ~'11, ........ ,M52 random IOO-digit numbers to represent ALL 
b. A computes f(.4LL)=f(M 1), .... ,f'(M52)' f- is A's one way function. 
c. A->B : " f(.4LL) ". 
- step 2: A tries to transfer cards from the I cards of DECK A: 
a. A embeds the cards in DECKA . 
b. Permutation choosing - (this sub-step is eliminated later, we need it 
just for the first approximation): 
- A chooses a random permutation of {I, .... /}: P A' and hides it 
unambiguously in EM( .. P A") 
- A-- >B:" EM( .. P A") " 
- B chooses a random permutation P s , B-->A : » P s ". 
- A computes P = (Ps'P A)' Let {I, .. ,/} be the order of DECKA derived 
from the order of ALL. P is a random permutation of it, and B does 
not know what PIS. 
- step 3: A sends cards to B: 
a. A-->B : " EM(Mp(i))' i= I, I » 
b. Oblivious transfers : 
(The goal of this step is to let B factor the embeddings of cards. The 
permutation P, the probability of success of a single transfer and the 
merging of the transfers of the different cards, randomizes which cards 
are to be factored. This is Blum's idea for sending certified mail [4).) 
begin loop: 
for j= I to k { k is the size of each embedding } 
for i= I to I do : 
A single OBLNIOUS TRANSFER with RECEIPT 
to enable factorization of n(p(i),j) 
end loop. 
c Getting a card: During the above transfer process B factors all 
E~I(M) so he gets M, then he computes 11M) and he knows which card 
~1 represents. If M E BSAW nothing happened, else B adds M to his 
hand. 
- step 4 : After B gets the number of cards he needs, he halts the 
protocol by 
8-- >A :" stop, I got j cards". 
end {protocol 4} 
The Remaining Problems: 
1. It is possible that in step -1 player B 
the last card he needed, and If he does 
DECK which he is not supposed to see. 
must halt the process right after he took 
not halt, he may see an extra card from 
\Ve will show a solution for this 'Halting 
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Problem'. 
2. A. knows a priori the order in which the cards are offered. Even if we let B 
choose which ni he wants to try to factor in., any order, there is still a bias. A 
knows at any moment (including the end of the dealing) the current probability 
with which any card is given, and different cards have different probabilities at 
least 1-( 1/1 ) of the time. The solution to problem 1 will solve problem 2 as well. 
5.2. SECOi\1) APPROXIMATION OF THE DEALING PROBLEM - THE SOLUTION TO THE 
'PROTOCOL HALTING PROBLEM': "THE SECRET BLOCKING" 
The purpose of this approximation is to explain the idea of 'The Secret Blocking'. 
The Solution to the Problems: 
- 1. A (symmetrically B) has a set of public keys : 
KE}~4 = REALKEYA U DUMMYKEYA 
REALKEY~ is the set of keys for which A has both the encryption and 
the private decryption keys. For the dummy keys, A has only 
encryption keys and he can not decode messages encrypted by them. 
Half of the keys are real; half of them are dummy. (symmetrically 
KEYB has the same subsets.) We assume temporarily that KEYS are 
given to the parties before the game by a Judge who knows which keys 
are real and whIch keys are dummies. 
A (B) publishes all his encryption keys in a random order. B (A) can not 
know which keys are real, and which are dummies. We call these keys 
'root-transfer keys '. 
- 2. the oblivious transfers in step 3 of protocol 4 are as follows: 
a. Before A obliviously transfers a root, 8-- >A "use my root-transfer 
key Ki " and then . 
A-- > B : " a root si encrypted by this key ". 
b. At first B chooses a key at random from KEYB . If he chose a real 
key he may get the factorization with probability = 1/2, but if he chose 
a dummy key he gets information he can not decrypt. Hence the 
probability that B gets the factorization is 1/4. 
c. It is agreed that the halting of the protocol is at the end of the loop 
in step .3. After B gets all the cards he needs, he must continue the 
transfers until the end of the loop. For Mi which he has not yet 
recovered, he chooses a random number from EM(MJ not yet factored, 
and for Its root transfer he chooses a random dummy-key. Doing so he 
ensures that he gets information he can not decode and still he can not 
tell what mvl(l\lJ hides. Because of the random choice of root-transfer 
keys dunng the whole process A has no idea which information was 
blocked like this by B. This is "The Secret Blocking". The secret 
blocking also solves the second problem. \Vhat is actually done is: B 
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chooses a priori which embeddings of cards to try to take and which to 
block. Thus P (the random permutation of the offered cards) can be 
chosen by A alone. 
- 3. vVe have a Protocol for Open Replay of the Dealing which is used for 
verification. \Vhen the game is over the Judge uses the receipts to 
replay the dealing and verifies that: 
.a. 8 got exactly the number of cards he needed, he got them from 
DECK, and he did not see any extra cards. 
b A always used the encryption key E which B asked him to use, and 
did not try to check a key's status by sending some other random 
message. 
5.3. HOW TO ELIMINATE THE CENTRAL JUDGE: THE SOLUTION TO THE DEALING PROBLEM 
The Idea is as follows: 
1. A chooses KEYB for B. 
2. A publishes the chosen encryption keys. 
3. K£l'B are dlstnbuted to B using a variant of "the subscription to a public-key 
protocol", using one root and receipts. As a result B gets a real-key (dummy-key) 
with probability = 1/2 (1/2). B takes keys until he has as many as he needs (say 
30) of each subset of keys. 
4. Symmetrically 8 chooses keys for A. 
5. The fact that 8 (A) knows the encryption and the decryption keys of all keys In 
KEVA (KEYB ), does not compromise the secret blocking. 
The Improvements to The Dealing Protocol are: 
1. In step 2. b the permutation (P) is chosen at random by A alone. 
() In step 3 b 8 randomly chooses which card embeddings to try to take. He 
applies the secret blocking to ern beddings he decides not to" take. 
·3 In step 3. b B halts the dealing and moves to step 4 at the end of the loop. 
As a result of the improvements the following theorem holds: 
Theorem 5: The "dealing of cards protocol" is correct according to its 
specificatIOn 
a. If no player cheats, then when a player draws the cards, the following 
properties hold: Fairness, Disjointness of DrawTl Cards, Security, 
Veri fiabil i tv. 
b. Any case of cheating is detectable. 
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6. THE COMPLETE GA.\lE OF T\tVO PLAYER MENTAL-POKER 
\Ve design a main protocol called The Game Nfanager which organizes the game 
and links the different steps and we design Protocols for other game steps as well. 
The game steps are· 
1. Discarding a card: A moves a card M from AHAND to AUSED in a secure 
and checkable ·way 
~ OpenIng a card . A moves a card M from AHAND to AOPEN in a checkable 
way . 
. 3 Opening a card from DECK: first, using protocol 4, A gives a card M to B 
then 8 opens r-.t 
It is easy to design these protocols since at the beginning of each of them a new 
random code of the abstract card sets is used. The order of ALL is the interface 
between steps and we can prove the following theorem: 
Theorem 6: The two player mental poker game is fair, secure, 
checkable and a direct simulation of the regular game (using cards) as was 
specified. 
i. GENERALIZATION: THE MULTI-PLAYER ~1ENTAL POKER 
i.I. THE PROBLEr..IIN t-.IULTI-PLAYER GAME 
In the two player game the cards are offered to 8 from the set DECKA = 
DECK U BSAIV, and 8 adds the opened cards he did not previously see to his 
hand. The disJointness of the cards he takes and cards that have already been seen 
by A (at any given moment) is a consequence of the fact that the combining both 
players partial knowledge is the full knowledge of the game, and that DECK, 
ASAH' and BSAW are mutually disjoint while their union is ALL. How can we 
guarantee, however, that B takes cards only from DECK and does not get any 
additional partial information, while DECKA~ n DECKB 1= DECK in the 
generalized SituatIOn? \Ve must somehow let all the players participate in the 
dealing and sttll keep the mutual privacy and security constraints. 
Assumption " All messages are sent to all players. This is a minimal assumption, 
because otherWise If even two out of the K players can communicate privately, they 
can make a coahtlOn and get an advantage over the others just by knowing each 
others' hands Also, in order to be able to replay the protocols, we assume that 
every message is acknowledged by all the players. 
The Changes " For each player j we define the following sets: HANDj, USEDj and 
SAlli are respectively the cards in his hand, cards he already used and their union. 
DUring the game we keep 
{ SAIVj n SAlVi = 0 for i I=j } and { SAIVj n DECK = 0 }. 
Suppose there are K players Let 8 be the K-th player and Ai' i=l, .. ,K-l all the 
others. We define 
DEC!\TOB =r~, n (DECK) = DECK U BSAIV This is the set that player B, 
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.... vho is taking the cards, is allowed to see and to choose cards from. \Ve call these 
cards Candidate Cards, because such a card is a candidate to be drawn by B, 
namely if a card r..,fEDECKTOB - BSAlY then MEDECK, and B can take it. 
The multi-person dealing protocol is a two-stage protocol: DECKTOB generation 
stage and Card drawing stage. These two stages are two coroutines, each of them 
has a current state and they run concurrently. 
7.2. THE SOLUTION: A PROTOCOL FOR NfULTI-PLAYER DEALING OF CARDS 
Protocol 5 : M1JL TI-PLA YER DEALING 
(Ai' i=I,.,K-l deals cards to B=Ak . They start at stage A.) 
current state of stage A is : "begin the stage in step I". 
current state of stage B is : "begin the stage in step 6". 
Stage A: DECKTOB GE~cRATION 
The stage starts at its current state: 
step 1 : The K-l players choose a common random permutation of 1, ..... ,52 : Q 
(B does not know what Q is). They embed Q unambiguously in EM(Q), and 
transfer it to B. (The communication between the k-l players can be done using a 
group key, see section 3.) 
step 12 : Every player Ai chooses his own private current code of ALL : ALV 
each A;-->B : " Q(fJALV)) ". 
(The players do not reveal the cards in the right order, but rather, a random 
permutation of them.) 
step 3 : For player .. '\ let: DECK; = DECK U (U j:j 1= JSAWj }) 
=ALL - SAH~. Ai embeds each card MEDECK, in EM(M). 
step 4 : Each 1\ chooses a private random permutation Pi. 
Ai-- >B : " Pi(E!v[( DECK,)) II 
(The cards are offered in order Pi' A; has to remember this order.) 
step 5 : Opening of cards: B tries to open cards using OBLMOUS TRAl'1SFERs, 
alternately with Ai' i=I,., K-1. He makes iterations over the embedded cards as in 
the two player case. During this process B can get the following information : 
a. Factoring of a card embedding : B gets a card code rv[ of some of the other 
players A; He can compute fi(M), but this gives him no idea what M is because 
he gets only the place of tvt in the permutation Q which is a random permutation 
and M is Just a random number. 
h. Getting a candidate card : During the transfers B realizes that a card is offered 
to him by all the other players, (the same place in Q was revealed in all Q(ALV)). 
This card is either in DECK or in BSA~V so it belongs to DECKTOB (it is a 
candidate card). Suppose B needs v cards and during the process he gets v random 
candIdates. Then the players remember the current state of stage A and go to 
Stage B. 
end {Stage A} 
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Stage B CARD TAKING 
(In this stage only B and one of the players (AI) are playing, but the others get 
and acknowledge all messages.) 
The stage starts at its current state: 
step 6 : Al chooses a new code of ALL: ALU . 
.-\1-->8 " fl(ALU)" (This time without permuting the ordeL) 
step 7 : A em beds each ~lEDECKl in EM(M). 
_,\-->8 " PI(EI\I(DECK1)) ". ( He uses the same permutation PI he used in stage 
A, the perm utatlOn of DECK 1 is the inter face between the two stages.) 
step 8 : B and Al use iterations of OBLMOUS TRANSFERs in order to let B 
factor t.he embeddings. B knows which card in the permutation PI is a candidate, 
using the SECRET BLOCKING he chooses to open only candidates. 
Taking a card: \Vhen B gets all the factors of the embedding of a candidate card, 
he recovers M and computes fl(M). If M~BSAW he takes it. If B gets all the 
cards he needs, he stops the process by 3-->_~: "stop, I got j cards". If he has 
already seen some of the candidates, then the players return to stage A 
end {Stage B} 
end {protocol 5} 
The reduction of the multi-player case to several two-player protocols implies the 
following: 
Theorem 7: The protocol for Multi-player Dealing of Cards simulates 
dealing of cards and has the specified properties of security, verifiability 
and fairness. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
\V e presented cryptoprotocols which can be used with a public-key cryptosystem. 
The subscription to a public-key and the secret blocking protocols are cryptographic 
tools, augmenting the power of public-key systems. Developing these tools and their 
applications and solvIng the multi-player mental poker game extends our knowledge 
of the power of cryptographic techniques, the range of applications of these 
techmques, and the boundaries between the possible applications and the impossible 
ones The study of these subjects is one of the main targets of recent 
cryptographic research. 
In deSIgning the protocols, we used a methodology that can be used for designing 
and prOVIng the correctness of long cryptoprotocols. \Ve observe four main design 
stages 
1. The axiomatic stage: \"/e have two kinds of axioms: a. The underlying 
mathematics. b The computational environment: rules of communication, user 
behavioL etc. 
2. The basic Cryptographic Techniques: Based on our axioms, we use or construct 
basiC algOrIthms and cryptotransactions like the RSA system, Oblivious Transfer, 
12 
1\ umber-Embedding. 
J. Top-Down Design of the protocol: The problem at hand is divided into sub-
problems (an analogous to modular design of a computer program). For every sub-
problem we develop a cryptoprotocol using the basic tools of stage 2. We take 
care of the security and other specified properties of the sub-problems' protocols, at 
the same time ensuring the specified properties of the whole process. \Ve use an 
Inference system which includes "security logic" and "process logic". (In our case 
we prove formal assertions about card sets and users' information and we use the 
global order of the cards to concatenate steps.) 
4- The Process Protocol: After stage 3 the 
comm unication channels according to the rules of 
handle additional administrative communication 
concentrated on the problem. 
process is executed 
the original process. 




This approach of divide and conquer (using the same 
proof techniques) will undoubtedly be used III 
cryptoprotocols that will be designed in the future. 
or other system aXIoms and 
other complex and long 
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